

BOOK REVIEWS



JEFFERSON DAVIS: THE MAN AND HIS HOUR. By William C. Davis. Harper Collins Publishers, 1991. 784 Pages. \$35.00. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, United States Army.

Even 125 years after the U.S. Civil War, Jefferson Davis remains a highly controversial figure. This latest work by William C. Davis is a complete and balanced biography of the enigmatic President of the Confederacy. It is based on primary sources, including Jefferson Davis's private papers and the diaries and memoirs of his close associates.

The man who emerges from these pages is a chief executive and wartime leader beset by insecurity and characterized by unswerving loyalty. This loyalty made him the truest friend a man could have, but it also caused him to misplace his confidence in generals who failed to produce victories on the battlefield. In that light, Davis must share a large part of the responsibility for the Confederate debacle in the west, where political generals and military incompetents experienced a series of defeats. On the positive side, Davis prolonged the successful resistance in the eastern theater by his unyielding support of Robert E. Lee.

The author feels that, in the final analysis, Davis's credits outweigh his debits. He created the administrative infrastructure of the Confederate government; he also prolonged the life of his nation beyond what any likely competitor could have expected to achieve. But his overall performance as a wartime leader must be judged woefully inadequate. This inadequacy was due as much to his inability to take decisive action when the situation warranted it as it was to the nature of the government that reserved so much power to the states.

This book presents interesting insights into civil-military relations in a wartime democracy. Officers and historians alike will enjoy this examination of Davis and his place in history. In short, William Davis has made another valuable contribution to the historiography of this nation's bloodiest conflict.

NONE DIED IN VAIN: THE SAGA OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR. By Robert Leckie. HarperCollins, 1990. 682 Pages. \$29.95. Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, United States Air Force.

The release of this Civil War history is timely with the release of *Battle Cry of Freedom*, the best-selling history by James McPherson, in the same year. McPherson's volume is an outstanding history and is obviously well received by the reading public, but it is much more scholarly in tone and weighty in its documentation and bibliography. *None Died in Vain*, on the other hand, is an easy-to-read, popular history that provides an in-depth look at the war and its participants.

Leckie uses the book's 67 separate chapters to break down the war by the individual battles and the major political and military leaders on both sides. He opens with a few chapters discussing the political, economic, and slavery questions that led to the outbreak of the war. He then moves chronologically through the events from 1861 to the war's end in 1865. Nicely interwoven with these are chapters that provide more background and understanding of such men as Lincoln, Davis, Grant, Jackson, Lee, Meade, Hooker, Johnston, and the like.

Readers who are familiar with Leckie's previous books will not be disappointed with this effort. As a general history of the Civil War, it will appeal to many general readers interested in a comprehensive survey of the entire war and those who led it. Although the book is not documented, it does have a good index and a sizeable selected bibliography of suggested readings. It also provides several maps, but they are somewhat general in their detail.

The book will not be enough for someone who is looking for small battle details; even a book of this size could not provide that degree of information on the entire war. But, overall, it is a good book for its intended purpose.

GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR: THE SWORD AND THE PEN. By John M. Taylor. Doubleday, 1989. 457 Pages.

\$22.50. Reviewed by Captain Rick Ugino, New York Army National Guard.

General Maxwell Taylor had one of the most distinguished Army careers of this century. He was a talented, inner-directed general who carried order and discipline to new heights, both in his career and in his personal life. Comfortable in both roles, and having a brilliant mind—coupled with cold ambition—Taylor rose to prominence and served in almost every prestigious post the Army could offer before his first military retirement.

His son and biographer chronicles this part of the story in detail. It is a good tale of what hard work and determination, along with ability, did for one soldier. But there the book ends; it gives the reader no real "feeling" about the general and no reminiscences by his contemporaries that might have added this dimension.

A reader of this book will think of descriptions rendered by Pulitzer prize-winner David Halberstam in his landmark work, *The Best and the Brightest*, published in the early 1970s. He wrote that Taylor was "cool, handsome, very correct, almost curt, . . . always in control, all business, all ambition, . . . cold as ice, . . . a loner in an Army where he was seen as aloof and self-centered." Halberstam goes on to say, "In spite of this, he was respected by his peers but more importantly, liked and respected by high-level civilians. . . here was a general they could deal with. . . a 'political general' in the classic sense, like Eisenhower and Marshall."

This book is a fine chronicle of a general's life and a tribute to his son's respect for him. But readers who are interested in a view of the whole person, as seen by those who worked with and around him at the height of his career, are better off reading the earlier Halberstam treatment.

THE AGE OF BATTLES: THE QUEST FOR DECISIVE WARFARE FROM BREITENFELD TO WATER-LOO. By Russell F. Weigley. Indiana University Press, 1991. 579 Pages. \$35.00. Reviewed by Colonel John C.

Spence III, United States Army Reserve.

This book, as the title states, covers the period between Gustavus Adolphus's victory at Breitenfeld and Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo. During this period of nearly 200 years, significant, if not immense, changes occurred both in the form of warfare and in the organization of military forces.

Russell Weigley, a Professor of History at Temple University, has written a well-documented and analytical book. The book's central theme is that the massive battle in this period failed to yield a decisive result. Weigley views war, in its total context, as a history "of almost unbroken futility."

Other themes in the book are also worth noting: Three of these are the rise of the military profession, encompassing a systematic program of officer education; the development of the concepts of command and control on the battlefield; and the means of achieving tactical decisiveness in battle. A fourth theme that recurs in the book is how, through custom and agreement, limitations were placed upon warfare. Specifically, in this period, the principle of noncombatant immunity developed. From time to time, Weigley points out, this principle was both observed and breached.

Finally, in his survey of the development of weaponry, Weigley presents a non-theme: There was no pronounced change in military technology; in fact, technology remained relatively stable.

One important point Weigley makes is that a nation's military power can be examined independently of its economic, political, and social structure. For example, Sweden, which was economically poor by 17th century standards, was a formidable military power. The same could be said of Iraq in the recent war in the Persian Gulf. Although Iraq had little to qualify it as an economic superpower, it did wield military power for a time, to the detriment of Kuwait.

This is an impressive book. Its principal value lies in its incisive analysis of issues that still confront military professionals.

PERSPECTIVES ON WORLDWIDE THREATS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FORCES. General Accounting Office Report, 1992. GAO/NSIAD-92-104. 57 Pages. Free on Request.

PAPERS PREPARED FOR GAO CONFERENCE ON WORLDWIDE THREATS. General Accounting Office Report, 1992. GAO/NSIAD-92-104S. 151 Pages. Free on Request. Reviewed by

Major Michael R. Jacobson, United States Army Reserve.

These two documents, prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO) for the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Armed Forces, are vital reading for officers of all services. They discuss the various threat countries and their capabilities and indicate what size U.S. force would be required to deal with possible threats. (The North Korean threat scenario is chilling.) A significant portion of the discussion is devoted to low-intensity conflict.

Single copies of these books are available from the GAO, P.O. Box 6015, Gaithersburg, MD 20877; telephone (202) 275-6241.

UNREASONABLE BEHAVIOUR. By Don McCullin (with Lewis Chester). Alfred Knopf, 1992. Reviewed by Captain M. Vernon, Canadian Army. \$23.50.

Don McCullin's work as a war photographer has taken him from Cyprus in the early 1960s to Lebanon and El Salvador 20 years later. By the time of the Falklands War, he could justifiably claim to have had "more experience of battlefields than any senior officer or soldier going down to that South Atlantic war." The somber photographs reprinted in this book are excellent images of war's indecencies, especially those dating from Hue and Biafra.

After his first experience under fire in Cyprus, he felt he had "a particular vision that isolated and homed in on the essence of what was happening." And he felt compelled to transmit this vision through his photos, which he wanted to have "the impact of ritual or religious imagery."

During the 1968 battle for Hue, he attached himself to a Marine company for two weeks and left it feeling almost totally exhausted by the experience. But the resulting photos, including one of a shell-shocked "grunt" clasping the barrel of his M16 and gazing into the deep distance, are classics of the genre.

The narrative of *Unreasonable Behaviour* moves along at a brisk clip reminiscent of Michael Herr's *Dispatches*. McCullin is unabashedly proud of his achievements, and no doubt Lewis Chester deserves some credit for tempering his emotions and prose. The book provides illuminating flashes of personal insight into virtually every "dirty little war" since the early 1960s, as well as into McCullin's own recent domestic troubles.

McCullin never got to the Falklands, partly, he believes, due to a deliberate campaign

by the British Ministry of Defence to keep professionals with combat experience at bay (with the exception of Max Hastings). This sort of treatment enraged McCullin, who, after nearly two decades of risking his life to photograph foreign wars, felt he was entitled to document the British experience. But any consideration of his exclusion also has to take into account his own stormy relationship with the staff Rupert Murdoch had appointed to run the *Sunday Times* in the early 1980s.

McCullin's misgivings about the inadequate documentation of the Falklands war are telling, in light of what has come out of Operation DESERT STORM. Not that gore should necessarily be the order of the day, but it does remind us—as a generation desensitized by television and movies—that war is the cruelest of all human activities. "Clean" photos of slightly anxious and uncomfortable soldiers do not convey this cruelty well. If we are to give war its due, we need to see more than patriotic shots of the Union Jack being raised over Port Stanley, or startlingly clear photos of Marines drinking bottled water against the backdrop of a perfect desert sunset. This is where the photographic vision of such men as Don McCullin is invaluable.

MATES AND MUCHACHOS: UNIT COHESION IN THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS WAR. By Nora Kinzer Stewart. Brassey's (US), 1991. 192 Pages. \$20.00. Reviewed by Leroy Thompson, Manchester, Missouri.

The author of this book is a behavioral and social scientist with an interest in military subjects. As a result, parts of it read too much like a research paper, and the author's occasionally glaring errors in military terminology are annoying. Nevertheless, she makes some sound points about what makes a military unit effective and cohesive in combat and what causes declines in morale.

Many of the author's conclusions will come as no surprise to experienced officers and noncommissioned officers; they are the same basic tenets that sound military systems always try to instill in their subordinates. The Infantry School's "Follow Me" motto, for example, is based on the principle that good junior officers and NCOs lead from the front.

This same fact was proved once again in the Falklands War, where British officers in general proved better at setting the example and inspiring loyalty, for the most part, than the Argentine officers. Stewart does, how-

ever, offer some excellent examples of Argentine leadership that was effective and that inspired loyalty.

She makes other important points about the Argentines' lack of any recent experience in warfare, which gave them an unrealistic view of the problems of modern combat. The British, on the other hand, have been fighting large and small wars throughout this century and are therefore quite aware of logistic and other problems. The effectiveness of the British regimental system in instilling unit pride was also borne out by Stewart's study. Other factors that affect cohesion and loyalty—such as patriotism, societal views of the war, bonding between buddies in combat—are also covered effectively.

Although I recommend this work, I suggest the reader skip the chapters that cover the way the research was carried out (they seem to be rather lengthy discussions of the type that only hard-core academics find interesting) and move directly into the portions that deal with combat effectiveness. These parts offer some useful insights into combat leadership and leadership in general.

THE PHOENIX PROGRAM. By Douglas Valentine. William Morrow, 1990. 479 Pages. \$22.95. Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

This polemic compares quite unfavorably to two other books also released in 1990. One of these is Orrin DeForest's *Slow Burn: The Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam*, an account by one of the most successful Phoenix managers. The other is Dale Andrade's *From Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War*, a first-rate academic study that addresses and gives a quite different answer to the question Valentine proposes: Was Phoenix a legitimate instrument of counterinsurgency or an assassination machine?

Valentine, a freelance writer, set out to demonstrate that Phoenix was an evil atrocity, little more than an instrument for indiscriminate torture, assassination, and other foul deeds. His thin research makes his conclusions hardly surprising and most problematic. (His research consists of the master's thesis and doctoral dissertation of a former agent, interviews with other disaffected Phoenix personnel, Stanley Karnow's *Vietnam: A History*, and citations from such stellar sources as *Playboy*, *Penthouse*, *True*, *Liberation*, *Commonweal*, and *The Progressive*.)

Unquestionably, Phoenix (and all the pre-

and post-clandestine activities that the author lumps together as Phoenix-type activities) engaged in unsavory and wrongful acts. But Valentine's paranoid fantasies and sweeping, unsubstantiated accusations undermine his credibility and call into question everything he relates in his encyclopedia of evil activities.

The book is not totally without value; but it should be approached with skepticism and caution. It is best read in comparison to the other two books noted.

LAWRENCE OF ARABIA: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF T.E. LAWRENCE. By Jeremy Wilson. Atheneum, 1990. 1,188 Pages. \$35.00. Reviewed by Major Harold E. Rough, Jr., United States Army.

The reputation of T.E. Lawrence—"Lawrence of Arabia"—has grown to mythical and legendary proportions since his controversial death in 1935. Numerous articles and books and an award-winning film about him have further obscured his life story, and it has become increasingly difficult to separate fact from fiction.

Historian Jeremy Wilson spent close to 15 years diligently researching and systematically investigating Lawrence's personal papers, diaries, correspondence, and publications, along with numerous official military and government documents that were not released to the public until 1968. The result is this biography, which successfully peels away the layers of mythology that have accumulated over the decades.

Lawrence's life is recounted in intricate detail, much of it coming from his own correspondence and diary entries. His participation in archaeological expeditions in the Middle East from 1910 to 1914, during which his interest in the Arab peoples and cultures was kindled, is fascinating and also essential to anyone attempting to understand his role in the "Arab Revolt" of World War I. Of similar interest is Wilson's recounting of Lawrence's attempt to achieve anonymity by serving as an enlisted man in the Royal Air Force and, later, the Royal Tank Corps, in the 1920s.

The text is illuminated by more than 60 photographs and sketches of Lawrence and others who played prominent roles in his life. Seven maps permit a reader to follow Lawrence's exploits in the Middle East before and during the Great War.

Lawrence was indeed an enigmatic figure, and Wilson has succeeded in penetrating the shroud of obscurity that has surrounded his

life. He skillfully places Lawrence's various experiences within the contemporary and proper historical, military, and political contexts. In many cases, however, he refrains from critical judgment in his quest to present a complete and carefully researched biography, although he is quick to contradict accounts that are critical of Lawrence, especially those pertaining to his alleged homosexuality.

This monumental biography—934 pages of text and 214 pages of appendixes and endnotes—exhaustively recounts all facets of Lawrence's varied life. It will prove to be the definitive account of this controversial figure and will be indispensable to all those interested in "Lawrence of Arabia."

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST. By Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr. Westview Press, 1991. \$24.95, Softbound.

THE MAKING OF THE MODERN NEAR EAST 1792-1923. By M. E. Yapp. Longman's, 1987. \$21.95, Softbound.

THE NEAR EAST SINCE THE FIRST WORLD WAR. By M.E. Yapp. Longman's, 1991. \$24.95, Softbound. Reviewed by Captain David B. Des Roches, United States Army.

Few modern conflicts are as laden with the burden of history as those in the Middle East. Positions in the Arab-Israeli confrontation are commonly justified in Biblical arguments; the radical Islamic confrontation with the West is seen as a continuation of the Crusades; and supporters of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait justified Iraq's position by pointing to the boundaries of the long-defunct Ottoman Empire.

Soldiers who seek to understand the often convoluted history of this vital region could do much worse than to turn to Goldschmidt's work. Written as a beginning textbook, it has an accessible format and a breezy, occasionally lurid, style that sometimes detracts from the narrative. Goldschmidt makes a conscious effort to steer clear of any bias in a highly partisan area, and he delivers what he promises: a terse chronology of the basic themes and events in the Middle East up to the expulsion of the Iraqis from Kuwait.

Professor Yapp's two works cover this same ground but from the period 1792 until the present. Yapp's studies are not as easy to pick up in the middle of a chapter, but a reader will find them more detailed and better written. They also provide a better introduction to the various themes of Middle

East history, as they explore these themes in more depth than does Goldschmidt's study.

Both studies are illustrated with maps and include bibliographic essays that refer the reader to different works on each subject raised. Again, Yapp's effort is more detailed. In addition, both works have chronologies—Goldschmidt's of events and Yapp's of rulers.

Soldiers will find both works interesting and useful introductions to the Middle East and its seemingly eternal problems.

HITLER SLEPT LATE: AND OTHER BLUNDERS THAT COST HIM THE WAR. By James P. Duffy. Praeger, 1991. 154 Pages. \$19.95. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Snedeker, United States Army.

The dust cover of this book states that the author has written three previous books and has had a life-long interest in military history. Unfortunately, no further information is provided to establish his qualifications for writing the book.

He begins with the premise that popular opinion in the United States perceives Adolf Hitler as a military genius and that it was only the overwhelming superiority of American men and materiel that led to his defeat. While this premise may be popular in some quarters, it certainly does not reflect the opinion of most who have read even the most basic history of World War II.

It almost seems as if the author is trying to take advantage of the popularity of "revisionist history." The author, by creating the impression that "most" people think Hitler was a military genius and then proving he was not, he can claim to have revealed the "truth" on these pages.

These "truths"—that Hitler personally caused a number of irreversible German defeats—are supposedly revealed here for the first time. They include Hitler's miscalculations over attacking Poland, and then on to the sands of Dunkirk, the failure to invade England, indecision and then blind stubbornness over Moscow and Stalingrad, holding back the tanks in Normandy while he "slept late," up to the final debacle in Berlin.

These are, in fact, truths, but they certainly are not revealed here for the first time—nor are the author's analysis and conclusions significantly original. Many of the facts were already known during the war. Most were thoroughly discussed and analyzed in Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart's *The Other Side of the Hill*, published in 1951. And informed readers became aware of these

truths, at the absolute latest, after reading an insider's account in Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's 1958 classic, *Lost Victories*.

Thus, *Hitler Slept Late* is neither new, revealing, nor revisionist. Instead, it panders to those who know nothing about serious history of World War II. The book tries to sell itself on the basis of outrageous claims and flashy slogans.

For the serious military historian, there is nothing worth reading here. Even for the first-time World War II history reader, there are far better places to start.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

17th AIRBORNE: THE BULGE TO THE RHINE. Video Tape. VHS, 48 Minutes. Kenwood Productions, 1990. \$24.95.

JOINT WARFARE OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Defense University Press, 1991. Available from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office (ISBN 0-16-035987-2).

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM: THE LOGISTICS PERSPECTIVE. A Special Report. AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, September 1991. 30 Pages, Softbound.

THE TIGER TANKS. By Peter Gudgin. Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1991. 160 Pages. \$29.95.

MEANS OF ESCAPE: A MEMOIR. By Philip Caputo. HarperCollins, 1991. 400 Pages. \$25.00.

JAPAN'S BATTLE OF OKINAWA, April-June 1945. By Thomas M. Huber. Leavenworth Papers No. 18, Combat Studies Institute, 1990. 160 pages. \$6.00, Softbound.

THE HORSE SOLDIER 1776-1943: THE UNITED STATES CAVALRYMAN: HIS UNIFORMS, ARMS, ACCOUTREMENTS, AND EQUIPMENTS. VOLUME I, THE REVOLUTION, THE WAR OF 1812, THE EARLY FRONTIER, 1776-1850. By Randy Steffen. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 216 Pages. \$35.00, Softbound. (First published in hardcover in 1977.)

INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. By Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree. Greenwood Press Inc., 1991. 688 Pages. \$95.00.

THE CHANGING FACE OF THE WORLD'S NAVIES, 1945 TO THE PRESENT. By Bruce L. Watson. Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991. 281 Pages. \$30.00.

GO TO IT! THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE 6TH (BRITISH) AIRBORNE DIVISION. By Peter Harclerode. Bloomsbury, 1991. (Distributed by Trafalgar Square, North Pomfret, VT 05053.) 192 Pages. \$45.00.

U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAM: THE BITTER END, 1973-75. By Major George R. Dunham and Colonel David A. Quinlan. History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1990. Superintendent of Documents Order No. 008-055-00178-1. 315 Pages. \$25.00.

MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, AUGUST 1982-

February 1984. By Ralph A. Hallenbeck. Praeger Publishers, 1991. 248 Pages. \$47.95.

THE HISTORICAL TIMES ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CIVIL WAR. Edited by Patricia L. Faust. First Published in Hardcover in 1986. HarperPerennial, 1991. 850 Pages. \$20.00 Paperback.

PELELIU: TRAGIC TRIUMPH. By Bill D. Ross. Random House, 1991. 381 Pages. \$22.00.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1990s: AN EMERGING PARTNERSHIP. By William C. Winegard, et al. Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991. 88 Pages. \$9.95, Softcover.

THE MIDDLE EAST MILITARY BALANCE, 1989-1990. By Joseph Alpher, Zeev Eytan, and Dov Tamari. Westview Press, 1991. 454 Pages. \$74.50.

NEWSMEN & NATIONAL DEFENSE: IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE? Edited by Lloyd J. Matthews. Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991. 146 Pages. \$11.95, Softcover.

UNDER TWO FLAGS: THE AMERICAN NAVY IN THE CIVIL WAR. By William M. Fowler, Jr. Avon Books, 1991. 352 Pages. \$10.95, Softbound. (First published in hardcover in 1990.)

MOTHER, MAY YOU NEVER SEE THE SIGHTS I HAVE SEEN: THE FIFTY-SEVENTH MASSACHUSETTS VETERAN VOLUNTEERS IN THE LAST YEAR OF THE CIVIL WAR. By Warren Wilkinson. William Morrow, 1991. 665 Pages. \$15.00, Softbound. (First published in hardcover in 1990.)

THE SOVIET UNION AFTER PERESTROIKA: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY. By Paul Holman, et al. Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991. 110 Pages. \$9.95.

ARMY RESERVE FORCES: APPLYING FEATURES OF OTHER COUNTRIES' RESERVES COULD PROVIDE BENEFITS. United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, August 1991. GAO/NSIAD-91-239. 49 Pages, Softbound. (The first five copies of each GAO report are free. Additional copies are \$2.00 each. Orders to U.S. GAO, P.O. Box 6015, Gaithersburg, MD 20877, or commercial (202) 275-6241.)

GONE FOR A SOLDIER: THE CIVIL WAR MEMOIRS OF PRIVATE ALFRED BELLARD. By Alfred Bellard. Little, Brown and Company, 1991. 328 Pages. \$19.95, Softbound. (First published in hardcover in 1975.)

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Anthony H. Cordesman. A Royal United Services Institute Study. Brassey's (UK), 1991. 224 Pages. \$44.95.

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED PARTNERS IN A CHANGING WORLD. By Mike Mochizuki, et al. Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991. 137 Pages. \$9.95, Softcover.

BEYOND GUNS AND BUTTER: RECAPTURING AMERICA'S ECONOMIC MOMENTUM AFTER A MILITARY DECADE. By Glenn R. Pascall and Robert D. Lamson. Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991. 169 Pages. \$23.95.

VIETNAM, 1969-1970: A COMPANY COMMANDER'S JOURNAL. By Michael Lee Lanning. An Ivy Book. Ballantine Books, 1988. 312 Pages. \$3.95, Softbound.